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ABSTRACT 
The expert witness is indispensable in a medical malpractice case.  However, there are three 
main defects in the currently existing expert witness system. One is incompetence of expert 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
 
               People are always more easily convinced by a judgment made on the ground of truth than 
of legal presumption, which determines that our judgment should be not only Afair@, but also Atrue@. 
The concept of Atruth@ constitutes an important foundation of the judicial system. Hence, many rules 
have been elaborately structured to find the truth, to speak the truth, and to safeguard the truth.1 The 
expert witness helps jurors and judges to reach the truth in cases centered on technique.2 Because of 
jurors’ lack of relevant knowledge, expert witnesses play a great role in modern litigation.3  
           The origin of the medical expert witness dates the 1840 treason-insanity trial of Edward 
Oxford.4 Expert witnesses were physicians whose education, background, and experience qualified 
them to explain to the jury the complexities of the care and the treatment that the plaintiff received 
and clarify why it did or did not meet, exceed, or fall below the required standard of care. Nowadays 
expert witnesses play a central part in medical malpractice cases.5  
        
 
                                                 
1 One example is that during the first step in the judicial process, jury selection, we question the jury panel in the voir dire (literally to speak the 
truth). See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. Legal Med. 185,189(2004). 
2 See Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 485,486(1997). 
3 Id. At 488. 
4 See Frank R. Freemon, The Origin of the Medical Expert Witness, 22 J. Legal Med. 349 (2001). 
5 See Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 44 (1986). 
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         Medical malpractice is a specific type of negligence, in which physicians are accused of 
professional failure in their care of individual patients.6 In medical malpractice the standard to 
determine whether there was a breach of duty cannot be based on the average reasonable person 
standard, but on the knowledge, training and skill (or ability and competence) of an ordinary 
member of the profession in good standing.7  Establishing the connection between the defendant=s 
improper diagnosing and treatment and resulted damage also involves complex medical knowledge. 
It is obviously beyond the ordinary and common knowledge of the lay jurors to establish the 
standard of care and causation. This makes the expert witness not only important, but practically 
indispensable in a medical malpractice case.8 Generally experts are required to prove the breach of 
the standard of care and causation in medical malpractice cases.9 
            Although the expert witness system is so important in medical malpractice cases, its 
enforcement is not satisfactory. Actually there has been an increasing criticism on expert witnesses 
among judicial opinions over the past ten years.10 It has been said that some courts suspect the 
competence of expert witnesses and blame them for the introduction of Ajunk science@ into 
                                                 
6 See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. Legal Med. 185,185(2004). 
7 See Prosser, Wade & Schwartz, Torts: Cases and Materials. Foundation Press, 11th ed, at 170. 
8 See generally H. H. Henry, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2D 
597, 598 (1962). 
9 See Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. Rob J. Aliff, Medical Professional Liability in West Virginia, 105 W. Va. L. Rev. 369, 372(2003). 
10 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 
253, 253 (2001). 
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evidence;11 some jurors doubt the honesty of expert witnesses. A 1992 poll conducted by the 
National Law Journal and Lexis found that over thirty percent of jurors polled in civil cases reported 
that the experts were biased.12 Some scholars have used an economic analysis of the expert witness 
system to point out the enormous social costs.13 Sometimes experts are described as mercenaries, 
prostitutes, or hired guns, or as witnesses whose opinions are sold to the highest bidder.14 On the 
other hand, expert witnesses are Afearful of being ostracized, losing patient referrals, and being 
socially and professionally shunned@ if their testimony is rejected.15 A great institutional and 
professional pressure can be powerful disincentives against testifying as an expert witness. 
         It has been pointed out that a perfect marriage between science and law is impossible.16 Law 
and science operate with different mechanisms. Their language and methodology are completely 
different. As far as understanding of truth, scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. 
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.17 Law operates with a more 
                                                 
11 See Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 485, 487(1997). 
12 See Gary N. McAbee, Improper Expert Medical Testimony: Existing and Proposed Mechanisms of Oversight, 19 J. Legal Med. 257, 258-59. 
As to social costs, they can be divided into two categories: form-related or substance-related. Form-related means the costs associated with 
finding the best actor to tell the client's story. Substance-related, means the costs associated with biased, misleading, and inaccurate expert 
testimony.  
13 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 
253, 255 (2001). 
14 See Lesile R. Masterson, witness immunity or malpractice liability for professionals hired as experts? 17 Rev. Litig. 393, 393(1998). 
15 See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. Legal Med. 185, 190(2004). 
16 AThe fundamental differences between legal and other technical fields, in terms of language, methodology, understanding of truth, and 
assumptions of risk, suggest that a perfect marriage between science and law is impossible. See David J. Damiani, Proposals for reform in the 
evaluation of expert testimony in pharmaceutical mass tort cases, 13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 517,530(2003). Id. 
17 Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence In The Age Of Daubert: Reflections Of A Skeptic, 73 U.Cin.L.Rev.867(2005). 
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pragmatic set of limitations. Law must decide the specific dispute between the parties based on the 
best information available, while science pursues an exact standard and can live with uncertainty. 
Because of these differences, it is hard for the legal community and the medical community to 
communicate with each other. However, this article aims to seek a balance between interests of the 
legal community and the medical community. Focusing on the main concerns presented in the 
previous paragraph, this article examines currently existing rules and offers some proposals in the 
following three areas: defining expertise, regulating professional negligence of expert witnesses, 
controlling dishonesty. 
         Chapter Two defines expertise and attempts to give a guarantee of the competence of expert 
witnesses. The first question is who can be a qualified expert medical witness. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 lays out general requirements for expert witnesses in all fields.18 Some states establish 
their own specific standards in medical malpractice.19 I would like to accept such a suggestion: If a 
well-informed reasonable person who suffered from the medical condition involved in the case 
would seek advice from the proffered expert physician regarding his condition, the expert is 
qualified.20 The second question is what expert testimony can be admitted. Even if the evidence 
provider were a Nobel Prize Winner, he cannot replace jurors and judges to decide the case. It is the 
judge who has the final authority to decide what law controls the case. The jury decides the factual 
                                                 
18 Federal Rules of Evidence 702 states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975) (revised 2000). 
19 See Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. Rob J. Aliff, Medical Professional Liability in West Virginia, 105 W. Va. L. Rev. 369,370(2003). 
20 See David E. Bernstein Improving the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases, 1 Law, Probability & Risk 9,16(2002). 
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issues. However, it is hard for lay jurors to evaluate expert testimony. Some standards can be 
followed. The Frye general acceptance test and the Daubert two-part test, which one is better? This 
part covers these topics. 
         Chapter Three aims to clarify some popular misunderstandings about professional negligence 
as it relates to expert witnesses. One opinion is that expert medical witness testimony does not 
constitute the practice of medicine, so the expert is not liable to his client for professional 
negligence.21 Another is that witness immunity exempts expert witnesses from any civil liability. 22 
Exempting expert witnesses from professional liability will encourage junk science to be introduced 
into the court. This part analyzes the arguments in favor of imposing professional liability on expert 
witnesses. 
           Chapter Four is related to controlling dishonesty of expert witnesses. This problem can be 
traced to a conflict of interests. As experts paid by litigants, expert witnesses serve as litigants= 
advocate; as witnesses, their duty to the court requires them to safeguard the integrity of judicial 
system. How to counterbalance these two different interests? This part suggests some measures to 
control the bias of expert witnesses. These measures are: establishing judicial fine; establishing 
professional regulation; hiring expert witnesses by the court instead of litigants. 
          
                                                 
21 See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. Legal Med. 185,190(2004). 
22 See Lesile R. Masterson, witness immunity or malpractice liability for professionals hired as experts? 17 Rev. Litig. 393,393(1998). 
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           Chapter Five is a concise conclusion. It is mainly a summary of the proposals presented in the 
previous parts. 
        Before the detailed discussion, I must point out that this article focuses on expert witnesses in 
the field of medical malpractice, but not limited to medical expert witnesses. The expert witness 
issue is also important in products liability and toxic exposure cases. Some parts of the discussion 
touch on these fields. Some conclusions, such as expert witness immunity, controlling bias, apply to 
expert witnesses in all fields. 
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                                    CHAPTER TWO DEFINING EXPERTISE 
 
        A. Expert Qualification 
 
In the language of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, a witness qualifies as an expert “if scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise”. This is too broad to be 
applied in a specific field. A more objective and definite standard of expert medical witness 
qualifications would decrease the cost and length of the testimony evaluation. Obviously, this is the 
first step to keep “junk science” out of the door of the courtroom. 
 
     1. Background 
 
     In spite of the necessity of expert witness qualifications, there historically have been few 
restrictions on expert witness qualifications. The witnesses did not have to demonstrate competence 
regarding a particular issue in the case. Even two decades ago, the judge in a medical malpractice 
case said, “A medical expert need not be a specialist in the area concerned nor be practicing in the 
same field as the defendant”.23 This was mainly because of the difficulty litigants in medical 
                                                 
23 See Letch vs. Daniels, 514 N.E.2d 675, 677 (Mass. 1987), see also Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence557, 570 (2nd ed, 
1996) ('A general practitioner of medicine can qualify as an expert on a specialty within medicine even though there are specialists who are more 
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malpractice cases historically faced in finding competent expert witnesses. In the past, the standard 
of physicians= negligence was established by the locality rule, which meant a medical practitioner's 
conduct was assessed based on the standard in the community where he practiced. This meant that 
the expert witness who was hired to testify had to learn the local standard. Thus the locality rule 
greatly limited the pool of expert witnesses. It would make things worse if the rule required that 
expert witnesses be familiar with the practice in the defendant=s field. Because generally physicians 
were unwilling to testify against local colleagues, for fear of damaging his reputation in the 
community and professional solidarity. Taking this situation into consideration, courts took a liberal 
attitude towards expert qualifications. Thus at that time courts allowed non-specialists to testify 
against specialists, and specialists in one field to testify against specialists in another field.24 
         Naturally, this liberal rule substantially expands the pool of potential experts. Some doctors 
even make their living primarily by providing consulting services and expert testimony to attorneys 
throughout the United States.25 Especially now that the national standard has replaced the locality 
rule, it is no longer difficult to find an expert witness. On the contrary, the real problem of the last 
decade is Ajunk science@ and Aquack experts@ resulting from the use of unqualified witnesses. In light 
of this situation, some courts have begun to set some requirements for the qualification of expert 
witnesses.26 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowledgeable within the restricted field.') 
24 See David E. Bernstein Improving the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases, 1 Law, Probability & Risk 9,10(2002). 
25 See Hall vs. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 875 (Miss. 1985). 
26 Thomas vs. University of Chicago Lying-In Hosp., 583 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (excluding testimony of pediatrician against 
obstetrician because expert had never practiced obstetrics, and 'more importantly,' had never treated postpartum bleeding); Lawson vs. Elkins, 477 
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         Some states set these requirements in statutes. For example, West Virginia=s law specifically 
requires that: (a) the opinion is actually held by the expert; (b) the opinion can be testified to with 
reasonable medical probability; (c) such expert possesses professional knowledge and expertise 
coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care . . . ; (d) such expert maintains a current 
license to practice medicine in one of the states of the United States; and (e) such expert is engaged 
or qualified in the same or substantially similar medical field as defendant health care provider.27  
Obviously, this is a thorough statute which provides a definite and detailed standard for expert 
qualification. However, it has been criticized as being unconstitutional. In Gilman v. Choi, the court 
held it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to require plaintiff's expert to have the same 
board certification as the defendant physician.28 Then in Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Foundation, the 
Supreme Court struck down the same or similar requirement as unconstitutional.29 The approach of 
the Supreme Court to expert witnesses in West Virginia=s actions was toward admissibility where 
there was a minimal showing of qualifications, determined on a case-by-case basis.30 
             Some other states have passed statutes which require an expert physician to be trained, 
experienced, and certified in the same specialty as a specialist defendant. Connecticut requires that 
an expert testifying in a medical malpractice action have had an active involvement in the practice or 
                                                                                                                                                             
S.E.2d 510, 511-12 (Va. 1996) (excluding testimony by neurosurgeon who had never performed or observed specific procedure in question). 
27 W. Va. Code ' 55-7B-7 (2002). 
28 406 S.E.2d 200,200 (W. Va. 1991). 
29 454 S.E.2d 87, 87(W. Va. 1994). 
30 See Mayhorn, 454 S.E.2d at 94. 
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teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.31 In 
Kansas, medical experts must have spent at least 50% of the two-year period prior to the malpractice 
action in active clinical practice.32 In Texas, an expert witness must be practicing at the time of the 
testimony or have practiced at the time the claim arose.33 Like in West Virginia, some scholars think 
these statutes as effective on restraining quack experts on one hand, but on the other hand, they are 
so strict as to keep valuable testimony out of courtroom.34 
     
    2. Analysis  
 
     Developing standards for expert qualifications is a balancing art. If standards are too liberal, junk 
science may be introduced into courtroom, as history has proven; if they are too strict, competent 
experts are barred from being witnesses and the costs of finding a qualified expert increase. For 
example, some non-practicing physicians are not qualified to testify under the statutes, but they just 
retired from work and they are actually competent to testify in the case. Perhaps litigants would like 
to hire such retired physicians since retired doctors could charge less and spend more time on 
testifying. Furthermore, sometimes the requirement that the witness must be qualified in the same or 
substantially similar medical field as the defendant physician works in an opposite way. In Petkus 
                                                 
31 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 52-184c (West 1999). 
32 Kan. Stat. Section 60-3412 (1994). 
33 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, subch. N. Section 14.01 (2000). 
34 See David E. Bernstein Improving the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases, 1 Law, Probability & Risk 9,14 (2002). 
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vs. Girzadas,35 the decedent died when negligent post-operative treatment by an orthopedist resulted 
in cardiac arrest. The court allowed a cardiologist to testify against the orthopedist.36 The court held 
that the decedent died of congestive heart failure, not a broken leg. Defendants' skills, experience or 
knowledge as orthopedic surgeons are not relevant...37. This case exposes the defect of written rules. 
No matter how detailed and how logical they look, rules cannot take everything into account. 
       The West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the court should decide expert qualifications on a 
case-by-case basis even if an expert meets the minimal standard set by statutes.38 This approach 
sounds flexible. However, this flexible approach presents some new problems. First of all, 
evaluating experts individually, on a case-by-case basis, without any principles or guidelines, will be 
costly, time-consuming, and contrary to the interests of justice. Second, what should the minimal 
standard be? According to the West Virginia Supreme Court, the minimal standard is laid out in 
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.39 Some scholars suggest that only scientists from 
accredited laboratories, or with degrees from accredited medical and other graduate schools, or with 
a particular number of years of experience in a specific field, will meet this standard. Scientists and 
physicians may only claim expertise in fields that are part of their respective scholarly curricula 
                                                 
35 Petkus vs. Girzadas, 532 N.E.2d 333,333 (Ill. App. 1988). 
36 Id. At 337. 
37 Id.  
38 See Mayhorn, 454 S.E.2d at 94. 
39 The rule states: Aif scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. 
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unless they have demonstrated the requisite amount of experience in another specific field.40 But 
what should accredited medical and other graduate schools be? How many years of experience 
should be required? Does this approach solve problems or create new problems? Is this approach 
flexible or not? With these questions in mind, I will present a new method. 
 
      3. A New Method 
 
     A constructive proposal has been put forward regarding this qualification problem. The 
reasonable patient standard asks whether a well-informed reasonable person who suffered from the 
medical condition involved in the case would seek advice from the proffered expert physician 
regarding his condition. If so, the expert is qualified.41 Compared with the case-by-case approach, 
this test sets a universal standard for all cases. Compared with those rules that allow only experts 
who share the same medical specialty to testify against each other, the reasonable patient standard is 
more liberal and more efficient in some sense. The critical problem regarding expert qualifications is 
whether the proffered expert has knowledge of the customary and accepted practices of the 
defendant.  Doctors of different specialties may Aoverlap@ areas of expertise. Doctors without 
accredited medical degrees may be proficient in practice. There are always some people who have 
the ability to testify but for various reasons fail to meet the requirements of qualification statutes. 
                                                 
40 See David J. Damiani, Proposals for reform in the evaluation of expert testimony in pharmaceutical mass tort cases, 13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 
517,522(2003). 
41 See David E. Bernstein Improving the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases, 1 Law, Probability & Risk 9,17(2002). 
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Litigants are free to hire these kinds of experts under the reasonable patient standard. The flexibility 
of this test can remedy the rigidity problems of written statutes. Although some people might worry 
that subjective standards allow room for judicial abuse of discretion, this test is consistent with the 
general practice of torts. In many areas of torts, we adopt a Areasonable person@, a Areasonable 
professional@ standard. Since these standards can be applied appropriately, the reasonable patient 
standard can be used as well. In my opinion, the reasonable patient standard strikes an effective 
balance between strict and liberal approaches. But the reasonable patient standard is novel. Its 
practical effect can only be verified after being adopted. 
 
      B. Admitting Expert Testimony 
 
      The second step towards controlling junk science is examining expert testimony itself. This is 
even more important than examining expert qualification. “Something does not become scientific 
knowledge just because it is uttered by a scientist.” 42 Courts always pay more attention on 
testimony than experts. The standard of scientific admissibility of testimony has spawned numerous 
articles, symposia, and informal discussions in recent years. From the Frye general acceptance test to 
the Daubert test, the relevant standard has been a subject of a great debate. After the Daubert test, 
scholars continue to make efforts to improve it.    
 
     
                                                 
42  See 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16. (9th Cir. 1995). 
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     1. The Frye Test 
    
     In 1923 Frye v. United States43, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the 
admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure test.44 The court noted: 
AJust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in 
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, 
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced 
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.@45  
        The Frye case established the general acceptance standard. This test requires a two-step 
analysis. First, the court must identify the scientific community in which the underlying principle 
falls.46 Second, it must be determined whether members of the identified scientific community have 
generally accepted the principle.47 
                                                 
43 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
44 Id. At 1014. 
45 Id. At 1014-1020. 
46 See, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. Ct. App. 1978). 
47 Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye=s General Acceptance Standard For The Admission Of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 
Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 861, 866(2003). 
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       Since this case, the merits and flaws of the Frye general acceptance test have been discussed 
extensively. Courts have pointed out four merits of the test: (1) The standard is judicially 
manageable; (2) the standard saves judicial time and resources; (3) the standard assures that juries 
will not be misled by unproven, unsound 'scientific' procedures, thus safeguarding the court's truth-
finding role; and (4) the standard assures fairness and uniformity of decision-making.48 However, 
flaws are also apparent. First of all, while the Frye standard requires general acceptance by the 
relevant scientific community, it fails to provide guidance as to who makes up that community.49 
Actually, the size of the scientific community chosen is a decisive factor in the Frye test. If drawn 
too narrowly, the so-called general acceptance does not make any sense; if too broadly, it is likely 
impossible for evidence to be generally accepted by the community. Similarly, how much 
acceptance can be viewed as general acceptance is also an important but vague question. Courts 
have also criticized Frye for being too rigid and narrowly focused on a single reliability factor: 
general acceptance by scientists. This narrow focus not only directs trial courts away from the true 
issue to be resolved -- reliability and scientific validity -- but also forces trial courts to determine the 
reliability issue without considering a wide range of reliability factors.50 Under this test some 
testimony on experimental science would be excluded though it is reliable and relevant. Last, trial 
courts play a  
 
                                                 
48 Zayas, 546 N.E.2d at 517-18. 
49 Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye=s General Acceptance Standard For The Admission Of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 
Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 861, 870(2003). 
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very passive role in applying this test, leading to claims of judicial abdication. Because of these 
criticisms, very few states now use the Frye test.51   
 
    2. The Daubert Test  
 
    In 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, inc,52 the Supreme Court displaced Frye in a 
landmark decision. In this case, the Dauberts alleged that their children's birth defects were caused 
by the mother's ingestion of Bendectin, an antinausea drug. Merrell Dow moved for summary 
judgment relying upon the affidavit of an epidemiologist who had reviewed the 30 published studies 
concerning Bendectin, none of which connected the drug to birth malformations. Plaintiffs countered 
with eight experts who connected the causation dots by reference to test tube and animal studies, 
pharmacological comparisons of Bendectin and substances known to cause birth defects, and a "re-
analysis" of the previously published epidemiological studies. The district court, affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, discounted plaintiffs' experts because their 
methodologies were not "generally accepted" within the medical and scientific communities, and 
consequently granted summary judgment for Merrell Dow.53 
         The Court ruled that judges should be gatekeepers in order to ensure that expert testimony 
                                                                                                                                                             
50 See State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 750 (Conn. 1997). 
51 Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years Of Frye In Alabama: The Continuing Debate Over Adopting The Test Established In Daubert V. Merrelle 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 35 Cumb. L. Rev. 231,231(2004). 
52 Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,579 (1993). 
53 Id. 
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admitted be both reliable and relevant. In determining scientific reliability, several factors serve to 
guide the judge. These factors include: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) 
whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) whether the 
known or potential rate of error is acceptable; and (4) the existence and maintenance of standards 
and controls; (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted.54 
       The Daubert test received extensive recognition from its inception. Although it was created by 
the federal courts, many state courts changed their standard from the Frye to the Daubert test.55 The 
Frye general acceptance test tends to be vague and abstract. In contrast, the Daubert test, with its 
testing, peer review and publication, error rate, and controlling requirements, is more concrete. In 
addition, the Frye test narrowly focuses on a single reliability factor, while the Daubert test uses a 
much wider range of factors. The Daubert factors are flexible, which means a trial court is free to 
use any number of factors in order to ensure the reliability of scientific evidence. Although general 
acceptance may be one way to prove the scientific validity of a technique or method, it is not the 
only way to prove validity and is not a scientifically created method.56 The most important 
improvement is the judge=s role as a gatekeeper. As is stated by Chief Judge Kozinski, 
A Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony 
face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world than 
before. The judge's task under Frye is relatively simple: to determine whether 
                                                 
54 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
55 See Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement From Frye to Daubert: Where do the States Stand? 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208-09 (1998). (stating that since Daubert, thirty-three 
states have adopted Daubert, and seventeen states continue to employ the Frye standard). 
56 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi chael, 119 S. Ct. 399,399 (1998). 
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the method employed by the experts is generally accepted in the scientific 
community. Under Daubert, we must engage in a difficult, two-part analysis. 
First, we must determine nothing less than whether the experts' testimony 
reflects "scientific knowledge," whether their findings are "derived by the 
scientific method," and whether their work product amounts to "good 
science." Second, we must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is 
"relevant to the task at hand," i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect 
of the proposing party's case. The Supreme Court referred to this second 
prong of the analysis as the "fit" requirement.@57 
     The reasons for gatekeeping expert testimony are twofold: first, experts’ observations may be 
inaccurate; second, experts’ conclusion may not fit in the particular case. Scientific validity cannot 
be equated to evidentiary reliability. It is just as improper for a scientist to rely on a judge to 
determine scientific validity as it is for a judge to rely on a scientist to determine evidentiary 
reliability. 58 However, there is suspicion about a judge=s ability to act as a gatekeeper. Judges are 
just experts on law.  Can they be good amateur scientists in medical malpractice cases? Are judges 
more appropriate gatekeepers than jurors? In our legal system, judges often play a more active role 
than jurors. Judges are the main decisionmakers. However, judges are just human being. In face of 
scientific testimony, they are laymen as well as jurors. Some psychological research indicates that 
                                                 
57 See 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16. (9th Cir. 1995). 
58 Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye=s General Acceptance Standard For The Admission Of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 
Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 861, 872(2003). 
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judges are no better than juries in assessing the scientific worth of expert opinion.59 In spite of this, 
judges have some advantages over jurors. Judges are repeat decisionmakers. “People who repeat   
the decision making-process many times in the presence of feedback regarding their accuracy are 
more likely to make accurate judgments.”60 Judges receive more feedback than juries through the 
appellate process, and through legal scholarship and commentary. In addition,  “individual 
judgments under conditions of accountability are more likely to be careful and thoughtful than group 
judgments without individual accountability.”61 Therefore judges can be expected to make more 
efficient evaluations of expert testimony than jurors. This is the necessity that the Daubert court 
required judges to be gatekeepers. 
  
    
      3. After Daubert 
 
      The Daubert test provides some guidance for evaluating expert testimony which is far from all. 
After Daubert, courts need more factors at their disposal to determine whether or not to admit expert 
scientific evidence,62 for example, the challenge judges face when a case concerns a new, cutting- 
 
                                                 
59 See Wells, Gary L. (1992). Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough? 62 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 739-752 (1999);  see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 
777 (2001). 
60 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739, 753 
(2000). 
61 See Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs to be Addressed, 17 J. Mgmt. 345, 
361 (1991). 
62 See Justin P. Murphy, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where Are the Ethics? 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217, 219(2000).  
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edge science, where reasonable scientists can have great disagreements as to whether or not the 
testimony would be reliable. 
       To cure the failings of the Daubert test, scholars continue their efforts to make some 
improvements. In medical malpractice, a practical model for the standardized analysis of medical 
negligence has been set up recently.63 An adverse outcome observed in association with treatment is 
not necessarily a consequence of medical negligence. It might result from background risk. If there 
were a link between a breach of duty and a poor outcome, the probability for the occurrence of the 
poor outcome would not be the background risk, but would be significantly higher in statistical 
terms.64 Thus we can judge if there is medical negligence by comparing the different probabilities 
for the occurrence. Further the treatment can be divided into seven phases. In every phase there are 
two options: the safest effective treatment and alternative treatment. To compare the risk of the 
specific treatment rendered with the risk of the safest effective hypothetical treatment, one should 
determine the background risk, the safest effective treatment, the alternative treatment, the observed 
risk and do hypothesis testing. After such a five-step process, one can come to a conclusion whether 
there is medical negligence.65 
                                                 
63 See Howard Smith, A model for validating an expert=s opinion in medical negligence cases, 26 J. Legal Med.207, 207(2005). 
64 Id. At 208. 
65 Id. At 208-14. 
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         This model is standardized and quantitative, while the rationale is easy to understand. This 
might cure Daubert=s failings to some extent. But this method is novel and has not been verified by 
practice. Before it is widely accepted by judges, the Daubert test will continue to control the 
admission of expert testimony.  
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CHAPTER THREE REGULATING NEGLIGENCE 
 
          When an expert witness negligently caused the loss to his client, is he liable for his client? 
This is a really controversial issue. As has been pointed out, an expert medical witness plays two 
different roles in a case. On one hand he can be viewed as a businessman who sells his specific 
knowledge to litigants and makes profits from this activity; in response to the market mechanism, 
the negligent expert witness should be liable for his conduct. On the other hand, as a witness, he 
serves the court and safeguards its integrity. The rules of evidence grant the same privileges on 
expert witnesses as on common witnesses, which makes them escape control of contracts or tort law. 
Experts often argue that witness immunity can exempt them from any civil liability, or expert 
testimony is not even a Apractice of medicine.@  Are these arguments adoptable? What attitude 
should we take towards expert=s negligence? 
 
     A. Does Medical Expert Witness Testimony Constitute the Practice of Medicine? 
 
     Professional liability is only attached to professional activities. For example if a physician causes 
a car accident in which someone is injured, he is liable for the harm, but it is not professional 
liability. In the same way, some people object to the idea that an expert medical witness should bear 
professional liability for his testimony. In their opinion, giving expert testimony is a game, a 
diversion, or a way for a physician to augment his income. It is not really practicing medicine, or so 
the logic goes, and one is not bound by the rules of ethics and standards that would apply to a 
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surgeon in an operating room.66 However, there is a growing realization that serving as an expert 
witness in a professional liability suit is in fact practicing medicine. Then the real problem here is 
that whether expert medical witness testimony constitutes the practice of medicine. 
       Nearly every state has its own definition of the term Apractice of medicine.@  In the language of 
Alabama ' Code 34-24-50 67, practice of medicine includes any act Ato diagnose, treat, correct, 
advise or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other 
condition, physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means or instrumentality.@68 In Georgia, to 
practice medicine means Ato hold oneself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or 
treatment of disease, defects or injuries of human beings; or the suggestion, recommendation, or 
prescribing of any form of treatment for the intended palliation, relief, or cure of any physical, 
mental, or functional ailment or defect of any person with the intention of receiving therefore, either 
directly or indirectly, any fee, gift, or compensation whatsoever; or the maintenance of an office for 
the reception, examination, and treatment of persons suffering from disease, defect, or injury of body 
or mind;YY@69  All of the Medical Practice Acts of the remaining states are general and remain silent 
on the specific question of whether expert medical witness testimony is included within the 
definition of the practice of medicine.70 In the absence of specific statutory language to the contrary, 
expert medical witness testimony cannot be excluded from the definition of the practice of medicine. 
                                                 
66 Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies' Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert Testimony, 13 Ann. Health L. 549,553(2004). 
67 Ala. Code ' 34-24-50 (1991). 
68 Id. 
69 O.C.G.A. '43-34-20 (2005). 
70 See Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. Legal Med. 185,188(2004). 
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The current definitions are so broad as to encompass any aspect of direct patient care, including 
examinations, surgery, and the exercise of professional judgment.71 The legislators just leave this 
problem to specialized departments, like medical licensing boards and courts. 
         In a study conducted in 1997 surveying the allopathic medical licensing boards of all fifty 
states, forty-one percent expressed uncertainty as to whether a medical expert witness is practicing 
medicine.72 Similarly, seventy-two percent of the medical licensing boards reported that they had 
never disciplined a physician witness for fraudulent courtroom testimony.73 Recently some cases 
indicate the intention of state medical boards that interpret statutes to include expert testimony 
within the definition of practice of medicine.74 This trend reflects that state medical boards are trying 
to police expert witnesses in a way they have not done so in the past.  The state medical board 
systems have two key functions: gate-keeping via licensure and quality control via standard-setting 
and disciplines.75 The functions of state licensure and discipline are limited to  "practice of 
medicine."  To exert a broader regulation, implicitly or explicitly, the state may interpret a 
controversial concept to mean the practice of medicine.76  
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Douglas R. Eitel et al., Medicine on Trial: Physicians' Attitudes about Expert Medical Witnesses, 18 J. Legal Med. 345, 350 (1997). 
73 Id. 
74 See Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440,440 (Mo. App. 1991), Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological 
Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967,967 (7th Cir. 2001). 
75 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 662 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Mass. 1996). 
76  Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontieres (or How I Stopped Worrying About Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future 
of Healthcare Delivery), 4 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 183(2004). 
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        The attitude of courts is quite split on this issue. Two cases with similar facts but very different 
outcomes provide an illustration. In Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine,77 
 an otolaryngologist made a false statement while testifying under oath as a medical expert.78 He was 
sued by the Board for violation of two provisions of Missouri law. The Board argued that testifying 
as a non-treating physician constitutes the practice of medicine because the physician uses his or her 
knowledge of a particular field to analyze the propriety of another practitioner's actions. Levine 
argued that all of the Board's cases that discuss the practice of medicine define it as the diagnosis 
and treatment of the sick. Finally the court held that the giving of expert testimony by a non-treating 
physician was not the practice of medicine as defined under Missouri law.79 
        However, in the recent landmark decision of Austin v. American Ass'n of Neurological 
Surgeons,80 the Seve0998tircuit Court of Appeals came to an opposite conclusion. Dr. Donald 
Austin, a Detroit neurosurgeon, who provided inappropriate and unprofessional testimony as a 
plaintiff's expert in a medical malpractice case, argued that he had never provided medical care for 
the patie09. The court accepted the argument of the AANS and AMA that giving expert testimony 
constituted practice of medicine.81 Judge Posner pointed out that although Dr. Austin did not treat  
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id.. 
79 Id. 
80 Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967,967 (7998tir. 2001). 
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the malpractice plaintiff for whom he testified, his testimony at her trial was a type of medical 
service.82 
 
       In light of all these arguments, it is hard to tell which opinion is more convincing. Logically, the 
essence of practicing medicine is to provide medical service by exercising professional knowledge 
and abilities. The biggest difference between medical testimony and traditional practice of medicine 
is whether a physician is engaged in the direct treatment of a patient. Is direct contact with a patient 
necessary? Pelton gives some examples. If a physician is called in by a practitioner in another area to 
consult on a case, it is common knowledge that he or she is practicing medicine. In some states 
physicians who provide medical advice via the internet to individuals who they never see are held to 
be practicing medicine without a license if they are not licensed in the State where the patient 
resides.83 Nowadays internet-based prescribing and dispensing are poised to become major 
components of healthcare delivery in the United States: In 2003, eighteen percent of online U.S. 
households purchased prescription drugs online, a number expected to grow to twenty-seven percent 
in 2004.84 In response to the development of internet-based prescribing, the traditional understanding 
                                                 
82 Austin, 253 F.3d at 974. 
83 Russell M. Pelton ,Medical Societies' Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert Testimony, 13 Ann. Health L. 549,556(2004). 
84 Eric G. Brown with Bradford J. Homes et al., Forrester's Top 10 Healthcare Predictions for 2004 (Dec. 15, 2003), at 
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of Apractice of medicine @ has to be broadened.  The direct treatment of a patient is no longer 
necessary. In this situation, expert testimony can be a type of practice of medicine even without 
direct treatment of a patient.  
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Brief/0,1317,33444,00.html.  
      However, law cannot be just logical. It should take social policies into account. On one hand, to 
confirm expert testimony to be Apractice of medicine@, further, to hold negligent expert witnesses 
liable, will force them to be more careful with their testimony; on the other hand, it might over-deter 
and dissuade potential experts from participating in civil litigation. Although experts are driven to 
the court by the motivation of money, they may make money in other ways which do less harm to 
their reputation even if they are negligent. Thus the costs to find a competent expert will increase for 
litigants. To strike a balance between experts and litigants, I suggest that expert witnesses should be 
held liable for their gross negligence. 
 
 
     B. Does Witness Immunity Exempt Expert Witnesses from Civil Liabilities? 
 
     Since expert testimony represents the practice of medicine, the same standard of professional acts 
and professional ethics should be imposed on expert medical witnesses. As the logic goes, if an 
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expert medical witness fails to do what a reasonable physician would do in the same situation, the 
expert should be held professionally liable. However, this apparent responsibility is often exempted 
by the reason of witness immunity, which results from the expert=s role as a witness. Should witness 
immunity exempt expert witnesses from civil liabilities? Maybe not.   
 
      1. Witness Immunity: What and Why? 
 
      The common law doctrine of witness immunity originated in English law.85 Originally the 
immunity doctrine operated as an exemption from liability for the speaking or publishing of 
defamatory words concerning another, based on the fact that the statement was made in the 
performance of a political, judicial, social, or personal duty.86 Three English common law cases, 
Cutler v. Dixon,87 Anfield v. Feverhill,88 and Henderson v. Broomhead,89 reveal that the immunity 
originated in the limited area of defamation law. The doctrine has developed in some situations to 
permit witnesses to speak freely in court,90 and to grant witness immunity against the use of any 
                                                 
85 See Black's Law Dictionary 1077 (5th ed. 1968). 
86 Id. 
87 4 Co.Rep. 14b, 76 Eng.Rep. 886, 886 (Q.B.1585). 
88 2 Bulst. 269, 80 Eng.Rep. 1113, 1134 (K.B.1614). 
89 4 H & N 569, 157 Eng.Rep. 964, 968 (Ex.1859). 
90 See Christopher M. McDowell, Authorizing the Expert Witness to Assassinate Character for Profit: A Reexamination of the Testimonial 
Immunity of the Expert Witness, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 239(1997). 
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evidence provided by or resulting from testimony.91 This has broadened the original witness 
immunity substantially. Most American jurisdictions qualified the immunity doctrine by limiting the 
protected statements to those relevant to the judicial proceeding.92 Generally witness immunity can 
be applied to communication: (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, (2) by litigants or 
other participants authorized by law, (3) to achieve the objects of litigation, (4) with some 
connection or logical relation to the action.93 Broadly speaking, the American immunity shields the 
witness from suit based on the witness' testimony regardless of the witness's motive or the truth of 
the statement as long as the statement is relevant to the judicial proceeding.94 
       When it comes to witness immunity, some people may use the 5th Amendment 95 as a defense. 
The privilege created by the 5th Amendment is a right to refuse to testify against oneself. Although 
witnesses have an obligation to testify in the court, it is unfair to force a criminal defendant to testify 
against himself. Similarly, case law developed some other situations where witnesses can refuse to 
testify. These situations include when the witness has a justifiable fear of self-incrimination and 
when the witness is so closely connected with the defendant by the facts of the case, the pleadings, 
or relationship.96 A husband has the right to refuse to testify against his wife. A lawyer has the right 
                                                 
91 See 18 U.S.C. 6002 (1994). 
92 Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming Hired Guns, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 497, 497 (1996). 
93 Opinion and Expert Testimony in Federal and State Courts, Sponsored with the cooperation of the Federal Judicial Center, SK075 ALI-ABA 
319. 
94 Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming Hired Guns, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 497, 499 (1996). 
95 U.S. Const. 5th Amend. 
96 See Russell Dean Covey, Beating The Prisoner At Prisoner=s Dilemma: The Evidentiary Value Of A Witness= Refusal To Testify, 47 Am. U.L. 
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to refuse to testify against his client. This privilege is often granted in criminal cases. Obviously, this 
right to refuse to testify is completely different from witness immunity we are discussing. Under the 
federal use immunity statute, prosecutors may grant immunity to such a witness and then compel the 
witness to testify.97  
             Testimony is the foundation upon which to build a case. Courts always try their best to 
acquire all relevant testimony. Witnesses play an important role in collecting testimony. Witnesses 
are viewed as friends of the court who came forward to assist in the attempt to achieve justice and 
who were granted immunity from liability so as to encourage their open participation and 
assistance.98  The common law doctrine of witness immunity is a mechanism that permits witnesses 
to speak freely and encourages full and frank testimony. Although highly valued, witness immunity 
is not always granted absolutely. Historically, there have been two types of witness immunity: 
absolute immunity and conditional immunity. Absolute immunity protects witnesses from liability 
regardless of the witness' motive or the truth of the statement, while conditional immunity exempts 
witnesses from liability only when the statement is made without malice.99 Usually the rule of 
absolute immunity for testimony is confirmed in such situations where a witness is absolutely 
privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a 
proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rev. 115,116(1997). 
97 Id. At 120. 
98 Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming _Hired Guns,_ 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 497, 497 (1996). 
99 See Christopher M. McDowell, Authorizing the Expert Witness to Assassinate Character for Profit: A Reexamination of the Testimonial 
Immunity of the Expert Witness, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 239, 245(1997). 
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some relation to the proceeding.100 The decision whether to protect the witness by absolute immunity 
depends on the importance of the social interest promoted by the witness. If the interest is of special 
importance, the witness may be protected by absolute immunity. If the interest is relatively less 
important, the witness may be protected by conditional immunity.101 
 
      2. Expert Witness: Absolute or Conditional Immunity? 
 
     Because of the importance of expert testimony, the witness immunity doctrine was expanded to 
cover expert witnesses. It was pointed out that if an expert witness could be sued based on her 
performance in the courtroom, his or her testimony might be distorted by a desire to avoid a 
subsequent lawsuit.102 To encourage frank testimony, some courts granted experts absolute 
immunity.  
      The expert's testimony may injure either the party hiring the expert or the opposing party.103 If 
the expert witness caused the injury of the adversary party and was sued for defamation, should he 
or she be afforded witness immunity?104 If the expert witness acted unreasonably and caused the loss 
of the hiring party, should he or she be exempted from professional liability? 
                                                 
100 Restatement (Second) of Torts, ' 588 (1977). 
101 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 114, at 816 n.3 (5th ed. 1984). 
102 Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 667 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). 
103 See McDowell, supra note87, at 242. 
104 Although the remedy sought by the opposing party for injury caused by an expert=s testimony is irrelevant to the expert=s professional 
negligence, I explore this issue here because of its relevance to the next part of this paper. 
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      a. Immunity from Lawsuits Brought by Opposing Parties 
 
     When the expert's testimony at trial is false and causes injury to the adverse party, generally the 
only potential action available to the adverse party is one based on defamation.105 Since by common 
law tradition, litigators have been given absolute privilege to defame in the judicial proceeding,106 
expert witnesses are often afforded absolute immunity in these lawsuits. A few cases illustrate this 
situation. In Clark v. Grigson,107 a Texas case, a convicted felon sued a psychiatrist who had testified 
adversely in the punishment stage of the plaintiff's criminal trial. The plaintiff sought damages on 
the theory that the psychiatrist negligently made an improper diagnosis, which resulted in heavier 
sentences than the plaintiff would have received if the psychiatrist had made an accurate 
diagnosis.108 In support of liability for expert witness negligence, the plaintiff argued that improper 
expert testimony would occur less frequently if experts [were] civilly liable for damages for 
negligence in reaching the conclusions to which they testify. The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, finding it more than counterbalanced by the policy of affording witnesses absolute 
immunity in order to encourage unrestrained testimony.109 
                                                 
105 See McDowell, supra note 87, at 243. 
106 See Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law Of Torts? 29:87, at 597 (1991), (the rule of absolute privilege from liability for defamation is 
alive, well, and flourishing.) 
107 See 579 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
108 Id. At 264. 
109 Id. At 265. 
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       In another Texas case, James v. Brown,110 decided in 1982, Marguerite James sued three 
psychiatrists who had filed reports with a Texas probate court concerning James' mental 
competency.111 James was hospitalized for observation and was examined by three psychiatrists who 
filed reports stating that the plaintiff was not of sound mind, was not competent to handle financial 
affairs, and was likely to cause injury to herself if she were not restrained.112 James was later 
released, and she sued the doctors who had indicated that she was incompetent.113 In her complaint, 
James alleged libel, negligent misdiagnosis, medical malpractice, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution.114 The false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims were dismissed for failure 
to state a cause of action.115 Under the libel claim, the Texas court protected the doctors from 
liability for allegedly defamatory statements, citing the Restatement of Torts as the basis for absolute 
protection from defamation claims.116 The court held that no statements in a judicial proceeding can 
give rise to a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of negligence or malice as long as the 
statement has some relation to the proceeding.117 
         As has been pointed out, the ground of this kind of absolute immunity is the balance between 
social interests and individual=s rights. In cases where an adverse party can prove that a witness 
                                                 
110 James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 916, 916 (Tex. 1982). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. At 918. 
113 Id. At 920. 
114 Id. 
115 Id, at 921. 
116 Id, at 922-924. 
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made a statement with malice and that the statement caused damage to the adverse party, there are 
two kinds of interests in conflict: (1) the individual's right to enjoy his good reputation and (2) the 
public's interest in the full and free disclosure of facts in legislative, executive, and judicial 
proceedings.118 If immunity were upheld, the rights of the adverse party would be damaged while the 
courts acquire the benefits of full and frank testimony. If expert witnesses are concerned about being 
sued by clients, they may testify in ways they anticipate will minimize their liability or may be 
unwilling to participate.119 Therefore, although a malicious statement that damages the reputation of 
an individual will generally be actionable, the proper balance for testimony is usually made in favor 
of society, rather than the rights of the individual.120 Additionally, all expert witnesses are subject to 
cross examination, and the threat of perjury charges adequately protects the legal system from 
erroneous witness statements.121 With these safeguards, the substantial dangers that an expert 
witness will present knowingly false testimony which will injure the adverse party's reputation do 
not exist. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
117 Id. 
118 See Christopher M. McDowell, Authorizing the Expert Witness to Assassinate Character for Profit: A Reexamination of the Testimonial 
Immunity of the Expert Witness, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 239(1997). 
119 Eric G. Jensen, When Hired Guns Backfire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REV. 185, 196 
(1993). 
120 See, e.g., Hayslip v. Wellford, 263 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tenn. 1953) 
121 See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 667. 
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       Recently some courts ruled that actions brought by the opposing party against the witness may 
be stated on alternative grounds.122 In response to this, courts have expanded the absolute privilege 
to bar causes of action other than defamation actions. For example, courts have barred causes of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relationship, 
invasion of privacy, fraud, abuse of process, and negligent misrepresentation.123 Regardless of the 
kind of action, if the allegations are pertinent to the issues of balance between individual=s rights and 
societal interests, absolute privilege would apply in the most events. 
     
      b. Immunity from Lawsuits Brought by Clients 
 
     The really controversial issue is whether expert witnesses should be afforded immunity from 
professional liability alleged by their clients. The courts have split on this issue. In the famous 1989 
case Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers Inc,124 two property owners sued their 
neighbor, John Nagle for the cost of restoring lateral support for their land.125 Nagle had conducted 
excavation work on his property which allegedly damaged the adjacent property. The property 
owners hired ByrneStevens, an engineering firm, to calculate and testify as to the cost of stabilizing 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Lann v. Third Nat'l Bank, 277 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1955), Bruce, 776 P.2d at 670. 
123 See Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 985, 998 (1993); see also General Elec. 
Co., 916 F.2d at 1125. 
124 See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 666 (Wash. 1989). 
125 Id. 
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the soil on their land.126 Byrne, as an expert witness for the property owners, testified that the total 
cost of stabilizing the land would be $ 21,040.127 The court awarded that exact amount to the 
property owners. The estimates turned out to be grossly underestimated, and it actually cost double 
that amount to restore the property.128 The property owners sued Byrne for his testimony. The 
property owners contended that the engineer was negligent in preparing his analysis and that, but for 
[the engineer's] low estimate of restoring lateral support, they would have obtained judgment . . . for 
the true cost of the restoration.129 
       The trial court protected the witness based on immunity, but the court of appeals reversed. 
130The court of appeals held that the defendant expert should not be afforded immunity: 
AByrne is a professional, with a pecuniary motive for testifying. He 
voluntarily undertook to render his expert opinion in the original action, 
knowing that the parties and the court would rely on that opinion. He was not 
merely a bystander who fortuitously came to have information relevant to the 
claim, nor was he subject to contempt of court if he refused to assume this 
undertaking.@131 
                                                 
126 Id. At 667-69. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. At 667-70. (Wash. 1989). About the discussion of this case, see also Lesile R. Masterson, Witness Immunity or Malpractice Liability for 
Professionals Hired as Experts? 17 Rev. Litig. 393, 396(1998). 
131 776 P.2d at 669 (Wash. 1989). 
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       Then a divided Washington Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.132 The court noted 
that, without immunity, experts would lose objectivity and would most likely adopt the most 
extreme position favorable to their client.133 The court also feared that the imposition of liability 
would discourage anyone who was not a full-time professional expert witness from testifying.134 The 
court was also concerned that one-time or infrequent experts would not carry the necessary 
insurance to cover the liability risk in testifying.135 
       The dissent in Byrne-Stevens argued that the purpose of absolute witness immunity was to 
prevent an unhappy litigant from bringing a defamation suit against an adverse party, not to shield an 
expert from otherwise actionable professional malpractice.136 Imposing civil liability upon experts, 
the dissent argued, would not significantly affect the fact-finding function of the court.137 The 
dissent reasoned that while some experts would be intimidated by the spectra of malpractice liability, 
other experts possessing the same knowledge would be willing to serve.138 The dissent objected to 
the majority's holding as violating common sense, arguing that the professional's malpractice outside 
the courtroom should not be immunized by subsequent publication of her opinion in a court of 
                                                 
132 Id. At 670. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. At 672. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
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law.139 Moreover, the dissent argued, the oath of a witness and cross-examination do not protect the 
client from the experts' unintentional negligence or matters that the adversary chooses, most 
probably in his or her self interest, not to contest.140 
         Although witness immunity was ultimately afforded in this case, the dissenting opinion fully 
addressed the theory of expert witness professional negligence fully. In the following several cases 
the dissents= theory even prevailed. 
       In Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co.,141 Mattco Forge, a manufacturing company, sued 
Arthur Young, an accounting firm, for negligently providing accounting services.142 In the 
underlying case, Mattco filed a federal civil rights action against General Electric (GE), claiming 
that GE had eliminated Mattco as an approved subcontractor for racial reasons.143 Mattco hired 
Arthur Young as a damage consultant and expert witness to assist in calculating lost profits.144 GE 
then alleged that Mattco had fabricated documents with the assistance of Arthur Young.145 Finally 
the federal case finally ended before trial in mutual dismissals.146  
       Mattco subsequently sued Arthur Young, alleging accounting malpractice.147 Arthur Young 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. At 675. 
141 Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
142 Id. At 783. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. At 784. 
145 Id. At 785-86. 
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moved for summary judgment, raising as a defense a California statute that provided a litigation 
privilege.148 The trial court granted Arthur Young's motion, holding that the statutory litigation 
privilege barred Mattco's claims as a matter of law.149 Mattco appealed. 
       The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment,150 refusing to apply the litigation privilege 
to a friendly expert witness and distinguishing Byrne-Stevens.151 The court noted that the 
malpractice suit in Byrne-Stevens arose from testimony provided by an expert to the court, whereas 
the underlying suit in Mattco for which Arthur Young was retained never reached trial. The court 
reasoned that extending the litigation privilege to protect Arthur Young from professional 
malpractice would not further the policy of encouraging truthful testimony.152 In addition, the 
procedural safeguards relied upon in Byrne-Stevens153 are not present when the witness has not 
testified at trial - she has not sworn an oath, faced the hazard of cross-examination, or faced the 
threat of a prosecution for perjury.154 While acknowledging that the litigation privilege shields 
litigants, attorneys and witnesses from liability for ... virtually all torts,155 the court pointed out that 
the litigation privilege is not absolute.156 By way of explanation, the court analogized to malpractice 
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suits brought by a party against his former attorney, noting that the litigation privilege does not 
entirely protect attorneys from suit by a former client.157        
        A case which followed the approach of the Mattco court is Murphy v. A.A. Mathews158. In 
Murphy, Murphy hired Mathews, as professional engineers, to prepare claims for additional 
compensation from Zurn Industries, Inc and to present those claims at an arbitration proceeding, if 
necessary.159 Mathews testified at the arbitration proceeding on behalf of Murphy for additional 
compensation in the amount of $4,888,390.160 The arbitrators awarded Murphy $1,118,608, which 
Murphy believed to be substantially less than his requested compensation.161 
        Murphy filed suit against Mathews, alleging that Mathews was negligent in its performance of 
professional services involving the preparation and documentation of Murphy 's claims for 
additional compensation from Zurn.162 In the malpractice proceeding, Mathews asked the court to 
extend witness immunity.163  
       The Missouri Supreme Court then undertook an examination of the history of witness 
immunity.164 According to the court, Athe primary rationale supporting witness immunity is 
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twofold.165 First, witnesses may be reluctant to testify if they are subject to a retaliatory suit by an 
aggrieved party.166 Second, witnesses may be inclined to shade their testimony in fear of a retaliatory 
suit.@167 In all previous Missouri cases, the court had applied the doctrine of witness immunity 
narrowly.168 Every decision was limited to subsequent actions in defamation or defamation-type 
lawsuits. Even within the context of defamation, absolute immunity applied only if the statements 
made were relevant and the court had jurisdiction.169 
           AThe present case is outside the realm of defamation. It does not involve an adverse witness.@ 
The court=s reasoning was clear. 
    ADue to the hired expert witness' function, we do not believe that the 
policy of ensuring frank and objective testimony is furthered by granting 
immunity. In most circumstances, these experts possess no independent 
factual knowledge concerning the litigation. Instead, they are usually 
retained to assist a party in preparing and presenting its best case in exchange 
for a fee. In practice, they function as professionals selling their expert 
services rather than as an unbiased court servant. Thus, immunizing an 
expert retained and compensated for providing litigation support services 
does not advance this underlying policy. We also do not believe that the 
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threat of liability will encourage experts to take extreme and ridiculous 
positions in favor of their clients in order to avoid a suit by them. Rather, 
imposing liability would encourage experts to careful and accurate.@170 
       In all these cases which  refuse to extend witness immunity from defamation suits to 
professional negligence, there is a widely accepted opinion that granting friendly experts immunity 
would not further frank and objective testimony. Rather, imposing professional liability would 
encourage experts to be careful and accurate. The latter argument is easy to understand. The reason 
that granting friendly experts immunity would not further frank and objective testimony has to do 
with the unique characteristics of the expert witness. Expert witnesses are essentially different from 
ordinary witnesses in that a certain ordinary witnesses is indispensable to a particular case while an 
expert witness is replaceable. There are several reasons for this.  
        First of all, expert witnesses and ordinary witnesses testify in different ways. According to 
evidence scholars, ordinary witnesses testify as to what they have seen, heard, or done that is 
relevant to the issues in the case.171 The testimony of ordinary witnesses is generally limited to those 
things they have directly observed or experienced, as well as reasonable conclusions that can be 
drawn on the basis of their sensory perceptions. 172 As the Rule for non-expert witnesses’ states, a 
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that 
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the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 173  In a word, ordinary witnesses testify to the 
facts of a case. Since the facts cannot be changed, the ordinary witness cannot be replaced. However, 
expert witnesses testify in the form of opinion. The function of the expert witness is to assist the trial 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue by exercising their knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education.174 AAn expert may opine on the cause or consequences of 
occurrences, interpret the actions of other persons, draw conclusions on the basis of circumstances, 
comment on the likelihood of events, and may even state her beliefs regarding such seemingly non-
factual issues as fault, damage, negligence, avoidability, and the like.@175 The expert testifies to 
ideas, concepts, scientific facts, tests, experiments, the results of tests and experiments, and the like 
that are not within the knowledge of the trial of fact.176 For this reason, there is always more than 
one person who is qualified as an expert witness in a particular case. Since the expert witness in a 
particular case is replaceable, there is no need to overprotect the expert witness from civil liability. 
After all, witness immunity is applied at the price of other people=s rights and the normal trial order.  
         Secondly, ordinary witnesses are regarded as unbiased court servants, while expert witnesses 
testify in the court for the purpose of money. As has been pointed out, the act of testifying as an 
expert witness is a business transaction within the expert's chosen field of expertise.177 According to 
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some articles, business for _experts_ is booming, evidenced by the many commercial services and 
expert databases that stand ready, willing, and able to provide experts to testify within virtually any 
category or area of specialization. Some advertisements even go so far as proclaiming that their 
particular expert testimony will result in reaching the greatest possible judgment.178 There is no 
difference between this business transaction and engagement in providing a professional service for 
a fee. Since in a business transaction rights and duties are relative and mutual, the expert witness 
should take responsibility proportional to his profits. Fairness requires this result. Furthermore, since 
experts are held to professional standards in other professional-client relationships, they should be 
accountable to the same standard when serving the court. This will not discourage experts to be 
witnesses, because their motivation for testifying in the court is making money. Although they can 
make money in other ways, there seems no reason to prefer other ways than this business since the 
standards are the same. 
         Finally, the function of immunity in the professional liability context differs significantly from 
its role in the defamation context. In the defamation event, whether ordinary witnesses or expert 
witnesses, they might be held liable to the opposing party even if they testified properly, if without 
witness immunity. So if courts do not grant immunity to them, they will not speak frankly and freely. 
Thus the truth may be hidden. In the professional liability context, professionals’= testimony is held 
to a more definite standard. As long as an expert behaves as a reasonable professional should, he will 
not incur any civil liability from the clients, even if he is not given witness immunity. In this context, 
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witness immunity would only encourage recklessness and Ajunk@ testimony. Furthermore, there is no 
need to worry about that professional liability will encourage experts to take extreme and ridiculous 
positions in favor of their clients. The threat of sanctions from courts and professional association 
will discourage them from doing so. 
        Some people may argue that without immunity, professional liability would result in never-
ending lawsuits. The apparent logic of this argument is misleading. Imposing professional liability 
on expert witnesses will not increase professional negligence lawsuits. An example will explain why 
this is true. If a doctor testifies negligently in the court, he may also treat a patient negligently. Let=s 
say this doctor can either perform 10 surgeries or testify in 10 cases within one month. If he testifies 
and performs surgeries with the same level of care, the possibilities of negligence in these two 
situations will be the same. If one more lawsuit about professional negligence happens in the context 
of expert testimony, the professional negligence lawsuits in the event of performing surgeries will 
decrease by one. Since the amount of professional negligence of the whole society has never been 
unlimited, the lawsuits of professional negligence in the expert witness situation will be limited.  
           Because of the unique characteristics of the expert witness, there is no need and no 
justification for granting them witness immunity. They should behave as an ordinary member of the 
profession. If they act negligently, they should be professionally liable to their clients. 
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CHAPTER FOUR CONTROLLING DISHONESTY 
 
      A. Phenomenon and Reasons 
 
      Although professional negligence is a problem, expert partisanship is an even worse issue. 
Judges, jurors and even lawyers have recently come to suspect the ethical standards of expert 
witnesses. In a survey by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, twenty-seven percent of 
Australian judges think that expert witnesses are often biased when testifying in the court; sixty-
seven percent of judges think that expert witnesses are occasionally biased.179 In America, a 1992 
poll conducted by the National Law Journal and Lexis found that over thirty percent of jurors polled 
in civil cases reported that the experts were biased.180 The lawyer Melvin Belli said: If I got myself 
an impartial witness, I'd think I was wasting my money. 181 In articles expert witnesses are often 
described as Ahired guns,@ Aprostitutes@ or Aactors.@182 A past president of the Defense Research 
Institute observed, if you put on a Hollywood actor as a physicist, he's going to convince the jury. 
Albert Einstein, on the other side, might lose since he's not articulate; he's a frumpy guy who hasn't 
had a haircut in three years.183 Bias happens often. 
                                                 
179 Paul Michell et al, The Uncertain Duty of the Expert Witness, 42 Alberta L. Rev. 635, 640(2005). 
180 See Gary N. McAbee, Improper Expert Medical Testimony: Existing and Proposed Mechanisms of Oversight, 19 J. Legal Med. 257, 258-
59(1998).  
181 Wrobleski v. de Lara, 708 A.2d 1086 at 1092 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), aff'd 727 A.2d 930 (Md. 1999). 
182 See supra note 14. 
183 Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S4. 
 
 
 
 
47
           There are several apparent reasons for expert bias. First of all, experts are paid for their 
testimony. As has been pointed out previously, ordinary witnesses are regarded as unbiased court 
servants, while expert witnesses testify in the court for the purpose of earning money. As 
businessmen, expert witnesses are susceptible to pressure to satisfy the demands of those who pay 
them. Cynicism about the fact that expert witnesses are paid is widespread.184 Another reason for 
expert bias is that experts are chosen by the parties rather than the court. Obviously the parties seek 
experts to support their case rather than to find the truth. So they choose supportive experts rather 
than honest experts. It is not uncommon that a party may knowingly select an expert because the 
expert has a relationship with the party or counsel, either as a friend, relative, employee or the 
like.185 
      Speaking essentially, the adversarial system creates this problem. Unlike Germany and other 
civil law countries, which stress judicial control over the fact-finding process,186 American law uses 
adversarial system. This system is one that pits two contestants or more precisely, their 
representatives - against each other to argue their cases before a neutral and largely passive judge. 
The parties control the investigation and presentation of evidence and argument.187 The adversarial 
system encourages the parties to gather facts and persuade judges or jurors that their presentation is 
adoptable. The court plays only a passive role. There is much discussion and debate about the 
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advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial system. For example, the former Dean of 
Northwestern School of Law John Henry Wigmore, characterized the adversarial cross-examination 
as beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.@188  Other 
scholars have charged that the American legal process provides numerous opportunities for various 
actors to distort the truth.189 Additionally, postmodern critics of the adversarial system charge that 
the outcome in an adversarial setting depends too much on the relative economic resources of the 
parties.190 The expert witness system is a small part of procedural rule. Under this adversarial system 
the parties have the right, and even are encouraged, to hire their own experts. Naturally the parties 
are not interested in finding the best scientist, but the best witness.191 Experts are motivated by 
money to support their clients. Under this adversarial system the court most often has a passive role, 
relying to a large extent on expert witnesses to find the truth to a large extent. Given this reliance, 
the expert witness should be objective and neutral. This conflict makes expert bias a big problem.   
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     B. Existing Measures to Control Bias 
 
     1. The Market Mechanism 
 
     The need for expert witnesses forms a market. This market is similar in fundamental aspects to 
conventional markets. The adjustments in this market are swift. Experts compete with each other. 
Money and resources are used to influence a Asale.@192 By the market mechanism, Judge Posner 
means that since many expert witnesses are repeat players, they have a financial interest in 
preserving a reputation for being honest and competent.193 Judge Posner also suggests that even 
professors acting as experts will be motivated to be honest because exposure of dishonesty to their 
academic colleagues would result in heavy nonpecuniary costs.194  
      However, some scholars criticize his analysis.195 In the market for expert testimony, experts aim 
to provide what the market demands, just like all other salesmen. What the attorneys demand from 
expert witnesses is not honesty, but usefulness, or effectiveness. This is the weakness in Judge 
Posner=s analysis. Attorneys seek a great story teller, not an impartial scientist who can help to find 
the truth. To be repeat players, experts must cater to their employers. In this situation, if facts are 
consistent with experts’= theory, experts will choose to be honest; if not, experts who want to remain 
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marketable may not be completely truthful. As for academic witnesses, Professor Gross maintains 
that, what an expert says in court is generally invisible and inaudible in her own professional 
world.196 In a word, the market mechanism does not provide a sufficiently strong incentive to control 
bias.  
 
        2. Cross-examination 
 
      Cross-examination is considered by some courts to be the principal safeguard against errant 
expert testimony.197  Using cross-examination in this way relies on the adversarial system itself, 
namely the opposing counsel, to control experts. In cross-examining a witness, lawyers usually 
reexamine the witness' testimony on direct, seeking either to get the witness to admit that he made a 
mistake or to frame an issue for rebuttal testimony.198  The lawyer exercises tight control over this 
process by asking leading questions to which he knows the answers.199 Issues which are within the 
permissible scope of cross-examination, which ultimately is decided by the court, may include 
interest, bias, or financial interest in the litigation.  
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      However, the effectiveness of cross-examination is suspect. In Harre v. A.H. Robins Co.,200 the 
court reasoned that the failure to discover perjury of an expert witness on cross-examination was not 
a bar to a motion for a new trial.201 The court recognized that counsel for the plaintiff had no 
discovery information on the studies that were the subject of Dr. Keith's testimony and therefore 
focused his cross-examination on the medical literature and the plaintiff's medical records. 
Realistically, plaintiff's counsel expected that Dr. Keith would testify consistently with his testimony 
on direct examination, and it would not have been in the plaintiff's best interest to emphasize such 
testimony on cross-examination as a matter of trial strategy and common sense.202  Compared with 
ordinary witnesses, expert witnesses have Agreater experience and preparation.@203  Therefore they 
are skilled in dealing with cross-examination. Particularly when the knowledge of expert testimony 
is beyond the lay lawyer, it is hard for the lawyer to do an effective cross-examination. So usually 
when an expert chooses to Afalsify data, facts, and tests and then testifies, using the data to form the 
foundation of his opinion, searching cross-examination may not yield any result other than to 
provide an opportunity for such a venal expert witness to repeat his already damaging testimony on 
cross-examination.@204      
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     3. Perjury 
 
     According to traditional common law rules, witnesses are required to give an oath before 
testifying. AThe oath focuses the expert's attention on his or her obligation to tell the truth and the 
solemnity of the task. It also provides the basis for prosecution for perjury should the expert violate 
the oath.@205 This rule was established more than two centuries ago by Lord Mansfield in Folkes v. 
Chadd.206 Theoretically speaking, the perjury rule should be applied to expert witnesses the same as 
it is to ordinary witnesses. Although theoretically it is possible to prosecute a biased expert witness 
for perjury, in the real world it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the expert to be tried for or 
convicted of perjury.207  The Illinois Supreme Court noted that it is virtually impossible to prosecute 
an expert witness for perjury.208 It is uncommon to prosecute witnesses in civil suits. For expert 
witnesses, because they testify to ideas, concepts, scientific facts, tests, experiments, and in the form 
of opinion, it is even harder to establish their perjury. The threat of perjury would be a great 
disincentive for experts to be witnesses. So this mechanism is actually ineffective. 
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    C. Proposals for Reform 
 
     The existing mechanisms fail to effectively check expert partisanship. To control bias, some more 
useful devices are necessary. In the proposals which have been suggested, three are important. The 
first is changing from a system of party-hired experts to court-appointed ones. The second is the 
judicial fine, where the court punishes dishonest expert testimony. The third is using professional 
discipline to punish dishonest experts. The rest of this article will examine the merits and flaws of 
each proposal. However, it has to be pointed out first that since each proposal is novel and untested, 
the discussion is largely speculative. 
 
     1. The Judicial Fine 
 
    Under the Daubert test, the court examines expert testimony by criteria such as testing, peer 
review and publication, error rate and acceptance.209 Expert dishonesty is not an issue expressly 
required to examine by Daubert test. This embodies the passive reaction of the courts to biased 
experts. Although the courts may Adiscount or refuse to admit evidence given by experts who are 
partial or lack independence@,210 this mechanism does not control bias, but instead reveals bias. It is 
a  
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remedy, not prevention. Even if the courts happen to find the bias, the costs of parties and courts 
have been wasted.  
        To react to the bias actively, the courts should scrutinize the expert=s character as well as his 
competency. When examining the expert=s competency, the courts can rely on the Daubert test as a 
guide. But what guides the court in examining the expert=s character? Harrison pointed out, Ain 
practice, judicial commentary on character can be sharply personal or simply lay bare a methodology 
that is obviously biased.@211 Some cases have described this faulty methodology. In re Aluminum 
Phosphide Antitrust Litigation212, the methodology employed by the expert to calculate damages was 
a generally accepted before and after approach.213 In this approach, prices charged during the period 
of the violation are compared with those charged during a period before or after the violation. The 
difference between these two prices is a rough estimate of the damage to the victims.214 In this case, 
the expert chose a five-year period during the violation and a one-year period after the conspiracy 
for the normative period.215 The court noted that the expert had declined to use data from the period 
before the conspiracy and that, if he had done so, the damages would have been less. In addition, the 
expert selected a normative period that was evidently the period for which prices were lowest, 
thereby increasing damages.216 Finally, according to the court, the expert had not considered some 
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factors that could account for the lower prices. The court concluded that the analysis [was] driven by 
a desire to enhance the measure of plaintiffs' damages even at the expense of well-accepted scientific 
principles and methodology.217  
        Courts should make public the identities of experts found to be dishonest. A reasonable lawyer 
will not hire an expert who has had his character questioned. In this way, the market will work to 
discourage dishonest expert testimony. If experts want to be repeat players, they will not take the 
risk of giving biased testimony.  
 
      2. Professional Regulation 
 
      Some professional associations regulate biased expert witnesses by professional discipline. For 
example, the Australian Council of Professions published a policy statement in 1998 setting out the 
role and duties of an expert witness.218 In America, delegates to the 1999 American Medical 
Association Annual Meeting have already proposed a form of accountability for expert witness 
testimony. The delegates resolved that expert testimony is open to peer review and, if particularly 
egregious, disciplinary action.219 In addition, the American Association of Neurological Surgeons 
(AANS) has enacted Expert Witness Guidelines and publishes a quarterly bulletin that includes a 
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section on the infractions of the professional conduct.220 According to W. Ben Blackett, the most 
specific complaints investigated by the Professional Conduct Committee over the many years when 
he has been a member, fall into three categories: (1) expertise (knowledge of the subject matter of 
the testimony); (2) range of the standard of care; and (3) advocacy by the expert medical witness 
(prohibited by the AANS Expert Witness Guidelines), rather than educating the trial of fact.221 The 
disposition of cases brought before the Committee is as follows: 25% or more are dismissed for 
failure to state a cause of action under the rules and regulations of the organization or for lack of 
merit; 12% result in letters of admonition or warning (not a formal sanction); 35% result in a letter 
of censure to the defendant; 25% result in six month suspensions; and 5% result in revocation of 
membership.222  
     Although these professional associations contribute significantly to the control of biased experts, 
they can not take the place of the courts. First of all, not all professional organizations have 
established expert witness codes. Secondly, not all expert witnesses are members of professional 
organizations and subject to professional discipline. Additionally, some professional discipline is not 
mandatory. So professional regulation remains a supplement to the judicial fine rather than a 
substitute for it.  
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     3. Court-appointed Experts 
 
     Strictly speaking, the suggestion that experts should be appointed by courts is not a proposal, 
since it actually has a long history in common law. Early in the eighteenth century when juries were 
self-informing and did not hear testimony, expertise was Afactored into their decisions by including 
experts on the jury or bringing them in to consult with the court@.223 At that time, experts were 
considered as a member of the jury or an advisor to the judge.224 However, as the adversarial system 
was established and judges came to play a passive role in which they relied on the parties to present 
testimony,  court-appointed experts were replaced by party-hired experts.225 
        The modern system of court-appointed experts is a response to the shortcomings inherent in the 
concept of the party expert witness. Under the adversarial system, the parties always hire favorable 
experts, which is a main reason for experts’ bias. The most logical way of solving this problem, the 
best in is changing partisan selection to appointment by the court. The majority of proposals to 
control bias involve using neutral or court-appointed experts.226 In the medical field, this reform 
received support from both doctors and lawyers, but some other lawyers opposed this idea because 
they saw it as a departure from the adversarial system.227 Because of this disagreement, reform 
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proceeded gradually. The 1920 case of Ex Parte Peterson recognized the power of courts to appoint 
auditors.228 In 1937, the Uniform Expert Testimony Act was passed which authorized courts to 
appoint experts on their own motion or at the request of a party while preserving the ability of 
parties to call their own expert witnesses.229 In 1946, Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure established the federal courts' authority to appoint and compensate experts in criminal 
cases,230 but a proposal to enact a similar rule for federal civil cases was rejected in 1953.231 It was 
not until 1975 that FRE 706 explicitly articulated the power of the federal courts to appoint experts 
in civil cases.232 
         The use of court-appointed experts may reduce the bias to some extent, but the rule still has 
problems. The first problem is its efficiency. Under FRE 706 the courts have broad discretion to 
appoint their own expert witnesses without the consent from the parties. However, in practice 
appointments under FRE 706 are rare.233 A survey by the Federal Judicial Center in 1994 indicated 
that among the 431 judges polled, 86% have appointed only one expert witness in their career.234 
Although the courts have discretion to appoint expert witnesses on their own, the courts do not have 
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the same time, resources or incentives as the parties to enable them to choose appropriately.235 One 
judge stated that appointing experts conflicts with my sense of the judicial role, which is to trust the 
adversaries to present information and arguments. I do not believe the judge should normally be an 
inquisitor. Courts may also lack confidence in their ability to choose an appropriate expert, and the 
class of experts the courts must choose from may not accurately reflect the field.236  
       FRE 706 changed the rule of selection, but it could not change the whole adversarial culture 
behind it. Accustomed to the tradition of the adversarial system, judges get used to playing a passive 
role in the trial. Although FRE 706 has given them discretion to choose experts, they do not have the 
same passion and interest in selecting competent experts as the parties do. The law just gave them 
rights, not incentives. That is why judges make appointments rarely. With this in mind, it is obvious 
that reform can not just focus on one aspect of the system. However, meaningful reform may change 
the fundamental features of the whole adversarial system. Because of its inherent conflict with the 
adversarial legal system, the concept of court-appointed experts is doomed to be ineffective. 
                                                 
235 See e.g. M.N. Howard, _The Neutral Expert: a plausible threat to justice_ (1991) Crim. L. Rev. 98 at 103; 
236 See Paul Michell et al, supra note168, at 649. 
        The second concern is that a system of court-appointed experts may cause judges to rely more 
heavily on the experts. Judges might put more faith in the experts they have selected. This attitude 
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may cause them to use the Daubert test in a more relaxed manner. For these reasons, courts= 
appointments are supplementary to rather than substitute to party selection. 
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CHAPTER FIVE   CONCLUSION 
 
           The necessity of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases is beyond doubt. The standard 
of care and causation present complex scientific issues beyond jurors’ knowledge. To establish 
negligence by physicians, experts are necessary. 
      The necessity often results in overstatement. The swarming of experts into courtrooms generates 
some problems. Three main issues are raised in this article. (1) How should courts exclude incapable 
experts? (2)How should courts regulate negligent and reckless experts? (3)How should courts 
control biased experts? 
       Although every state has its power to give different answers to these questions, this article is 
trying to make analysis based on legal principles. These three questions are actually puzzles 
regarding the issue of expert witnesses. For the first one, it is hard for lay jurors to tell good science 
from junk science. In the context of medicine, it is even harder because the dispute arose from 
medical malpractice is not only scientific but also uncertain. Even if there is a definitive answer in 
science, medical practitioners often disagree Awidely and wildly.@237 The suggestion of this article is 
to rely on the standards of expert qualification and admitting expert testimony. For the second one, 
this article distinguishes expert witnesses from lay witnesses, and concludes witness immunity 
should not be extended to a friendly expert witness. Thus negligent experts should be regulated by 
                                                 
237 James C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law 96, (1993). 
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professional responsibility. For the third one, the bias of experts is inherent in the adversarial system. 
This article gives some proposals to control it, but it is almost impossible to get rid of it. 
         All these measures and proposals seem to take the opposite side of experts. Actually this article 
is not aiming to put such a great pressure on experts that discourages them to be witnesses. All 
efforts are seeking a balance between the legal community and the medical community although the 
concept of Aperfect@ justice in legal system is impossible to achieve.  
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